Rear Operations

This monograph examines the core principle of US doctrine for rear operations, economy of force. The impetus of the doctrine is the belief that the outcome of war hinges on close operations. This has two implications for rear defense. First, given scarce resources, risk must be taken in the rear. Second, enemy attacks to the rear are seen as diversions. To avoid draining combat power from the front-line, the doctrine advises graduated response to rear attacks. Rear units must first defend themselves. Military police respond to destroy or delay threat forces outside local unit self-defense capability. Combat forces undertake rear operations only when military police can't handle the threat. The monograph explores the military theory underpinning rear attacks and then reviews the Soviet doctrine for deep attack. It concludes that the US doctrine is incorrect in basic assumptions about the purpose for rear attacks, and consequently provides a tactical framework and battlefield organization inadequate to counter the Soviet deep attack. Economy of force in the rear is necessary, but needs modification to emphasize protection of selective targets such as airbases, nuclear weapons, key pivots of maneuver which have strategic and operational importance. Graduated response violates sound tactical practice. It surrenders the advantages of defense and commits forces to battle piecemeal. Moreover, it senselessly layers response with military police who are clearly incapable of fighting the forces the Soviets intend to use to conduct the deep attack.