Populism without Democracy

When the economy collapses, why doesn't the regime fall?

A GDP contraction of more than 75%, six-digit hyperinflation, and the exodus of nearly eight million people were not enough to bring down the government of Nicolás Maduro. Why does an autocracy survive its own economic collapse? Populism without Democracy answers this question with an original theoretical contribution-the Rentier Style: the political and institutional architecture that makes populism without democracy viable and neutralizes the mechanisms that, in a democracy, would force a change of government in the face of catastrophe.

From a transdisciplinary perspective that brings together economics, political science, and public management, the author reformulates the classic Dornbusch-Edwards model of macroeconomic populism for rentier and authoritarian contexts, and tests it against the hard evidence of PDVSA, the Orinoco Mining Arc, the CLAP food-supply networks, and the Carnet de la Patria system of social control. Three epilogues extend the analysis through 2026-from the July 2024 electoral fraud to the capture of Maduro and the uncertain transition that followed-putting the model's predictions to the test in real time.

Grounded in the systematic use of investigative journalism as a primary source, this is a reference work for understanding twenty-first-century rentier authoritarianism. More than a case study, it is a warning: a map for recognizing authoritarian drift before it becomes irreversible.