U.S. Army Doctrine

This monograph examines the value of doctrine and compares various approaches to doctrinal development. The paper is based on the premise that US Army doctrine changes so rapidly that there is no common understanding of our basic doctrine. The thesis of the paper is that through an examination of current and historical cases, the common factors of successful development and use of doctrine can be identified. The objective of the paper is to identify "success factors" that can be used in subsequent modification of the US Army system for doctrinal development that balances between adjustments too frequent to be absorbed and too slow to meet the demands of the changes in the environment. A brief introductory section examines the origin of military doctrine, compares historical and contemporary definitions of doctrine and reviews the value of a commonly understood lexicon within an armed force. Next, the monograph examines two approaches to doctrine as well as periods when doctrine was tested (periods of combat) in the Soviet and German Armed Forces. The following research questions are raised in each case: 1. Was/is the doctrine compatible with the civilian society the armed forces were designed to defend? 2. At what pace was the doctrine developed (evolutionary or revolutionary)? 3. How long did it take to implement the changed doctrine? 4. Did/does the doctrine provide a common lexicon? 5. Did the doctrine survive the transition to war? 6. Did the doctrinal development system provide for rapid assimilation of lessons learned in combat? The conclusions present eight historically supported doctrinal development success factors. These factors are recommended as the starting point for discussions on improvements to the current U.S. doctrinal development system.